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Profits as Commercial Success
A B ST R ACT. Courts often use the extent of a patented invention's commercial success as
crucial nontechnical proof of the patent's validity. Relying on misguided economic reasoning,
most courts use revenue as the primary yardstick for commercial success. This Note argues that
courts instead should use profits as the proper measure of an invention's commercial success.
Current jurisprudence's use of revenue reflects the flawed premise that firms maximize revenues
rather than maximizing profits. As a result, courts will often find commercial success when the
financial data suggest otherwise and vice versa. This Note finds the accounting and economic
issues involved to be insubstantial, while requiring a threshold profit showing could materially
further judicial economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation typically involves highly technical issues.' Fact-finding
responsibility, however, falls to juries and judges who rarely have a technical
background and who virtually never have one in the specific field of the patents
in question.' The vast majority of patent disputes require the fact-finder to
determine whether the underlying invention meets the core statutory
requirement of not being obvious.' Courts have developed a number of
nontechnical, "secondary" considerations to aid the nonobviousness inquiry,
with commercial success being the most commonly employed. If an invention
met with commercial success, the reasoning goes, the likelihood increases that
it was not obvious to competitors who otherwise would have been motivated to
develop it themselves. But what evidence should prove commercial success?
Ask economists or businesspeople what motivates businesses, and they will
tell you profits. The pursuit of profits drives the creation of new businesses and
investment in existing ones. Accountants' income statements typically put the
1. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), which makes the initial determination of
patentability, is staffed with technical experts. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent
Operations, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dacp/peg/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
("Patent Operations has more than 3500 highly skilled scientists and engineers."); U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Examiner Qualifications,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/ac/ahrpa/ohr/jobs/qualifications.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007)
(listing technical or science degrees that qualify one as a patent examiner). As a result,
commercial success is less determinative than it is in nontechnical courts. On commercial
success, see infra Part I.
a. Justice Frankfurter noted:
It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to
discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation. The scientific
attainments of a Lord Moulton are perhaps unique in the annals of the English-
speaking judiciary. However, so long as the Congress, for the purposes of
patentability, makes the determination of originality a judicial function, judges
must overcome their scientific incompetence as best they can.
Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 6o-6i (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has several
notable exceptions to this rule: Judge Pauline Newman (doctorate in chemistry), Judge Alan
D. Lourie (doctorate in chemistry), Judge Richard Linn (bachelor's in electrical
engineering), and Judge Kimberly Ann Moore (bachelor's and master's in electrical
engineering). See John D. Collier, How To Win in the Federal Circuit's Patent Trial Division,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2002, at 22, 22; United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, Judicial Biographies, http://fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); see also infra note 9 and accompanying text. Empirically,
obviousness is the leading basis for finding a patent invalid in litigation. John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Qj. 185, 208
(1998).
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profit figure on the "bottom line," which has become a synonym for
paramount consideration.4
Current commercial success jurisprudence, however, works from the
misconception that businesses are motivated by revenue. This Note will show
how this flawed economic assumption can easily lead to erroneous
determinations of patent validity and encourage abuses of the patent system.
Part I traces the origins and rise of commercial success as one of the most
important determinants of patent validity-and the justification for using
commercial success, a nontechnical variable, as evidence for making an
essentially technical decision. Part II describes situations in which equating
commercial success with revenues leads to the wrong decision on patent
validity, even to the point of encouraging abuse of the patent system. Part III
touches on how courts can judge profitability and considers how using
profitability could actually further judicial economy. Finally, Part IV refutes a
potential normative argument for using revenue instead of profits.
I. COMMERCIAL SUCCESS'S KEY ROLE IN PATENT LAW
A patent is analogous to a deed in real property- but instead of specifying
ownership of certain land, a patent specifies ownership of a particular area of
technology.' While a county recorder's office maintains records of real property
deeds, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examines applications and
determines whether and what patents to grant. Just as an owner of real
property may sue for trespass, a patentee may sue for infringement.
An accused infringer will almost always counterclaim that the patent in
question is invalid,6 essentially arguing that the patent does not meet the
statutory requirements for patentability and that the PTO erred in issuing the
patent. Accused infringers have greater incentives and resources to find proof
of invalidity than does the PTO. As a result, roughly half of all patent
4. See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DicTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1993) (defining "bottom line" as
"the deciding or crucial factor").
s. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917); In re
Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (comparing the claims in a patent to the "metes
and bounds of a deed identiflying] a plot of land").
6. Often, the accused infringer will only need to invalidate the subset of claims that form the
basis of the infringement suit to prevail and hence will limit the invalidity challenge to that
subset.
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infringement cases result in the invalidation of part or all of the patent, and
litigants hotly contest validity.7
The most frequent statutory basis for a finding of invalidity is that the
patented invention is obvious.8 The U.S. Patent Act provides:
A patent may not be obtained.., if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior [technology] are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the ...
[relevant] subject matter .... 9
Commentators have noted that nonobviousness is the greatest hurdle to
receiving or enforcing a patent, calling it "the ultimate condition of
patentability."1
Determining nonobviousness presents two substantial challenges to the
judge or jury.' First, the fact-finder is virtually never a "person having
ordinary skill" in the relevant technology. Second, the point of reference is the
time of the invention, while litigation often arises many years later, during
which time the field has made substantial progress.
Consider one typical case involving nonobviousness, in which the parties
contested a patent on the antibiotic Cipro, invented twenty-one years before
the litigation. The fact-finder determined that a "person of ordinary skill" at
the time of its invention "would have had a Ph.D. in chemistry, organic
chemistry or microbiology,"' 3 with "several years of work experience in the
7. Allison & Lemley, supra note 3, at 205 (forty-six percent invalid). Overall, patentees, who
must prove both validity and infringement to prevail, only win approximately twenty-five
percent of cases. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34
AIPLA QZJ. 1, 5-6 (2006).
8. Allison & Lemley, supra note 3, at 208 tbl.i.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
io. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 803, 812 (1988) (quoting NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE
CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 198o)).
ii. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) ("Under § 103, the scope and content of the
prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are
to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.").
12. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (warning against hindsight);
see also Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
13. Bayer AG v. Carlsbad Tech., Inc., No. o1CVo867-B, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27830, at *11
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2002).
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pharmaceutical industry designing drugs."'4 In this case, the fact-finder not
only had to view an invention from the perspective of an extraordinarily skilled
scientist, he also had to do so while ignoring twenty-one years of hindsight and
progress! While this task would challenge a panel of luminaries in the field, it
poses a far greater challenge to a generalist judge or jury of laypersons.
To aid fact-finders presented with such thorny challenges, courts have
developed the nontechnical "secondary considerations" of nonobviousness.
These include long-felt need, failure of others, professional approval, and,
most importantly, commercial success."5 Although a patent case could proceed
without invoking any of these secondary considerations, in practice, litigants
often marshal all possible arguments, including commercial success.
A. The Growing Importance of Commercial Success
The Supreme Court has recognized commercial success as a possible
determinant of patent validity since 1876.16 In 1966, with the landmark
decision of Graham v. John Deere Co. ,'17 the Court reaffirmed the vitality of
secondary considerations "[a]s indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness." 18
The Court listed commercial success as the first secondary consideration.19
14. Id.
iS. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (listing "commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure
of others, etc." (emphasis added)); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (giving extra weight to the Graham factors, of which commercial
success is the first); see also Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 570
(E.D. Pa. 2003) ("Secondary considerations that may be taken into account are: (1) long-felt
but unsolved need; (2) commercial success; (3) failed efforts of others; (4) copying by
others; (5) praise for the invention; (7) [sic] unexpected results; (8) disbelief of experts; (9)
general skepticism of those in the art; (io) commercial acquiescence; and (11) simultaneous
development."). See generally 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05 (2007).
16. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495-96 (1876) (stating that the
general use of an invention is always a factor to be considered in determining validity and
noting that in a close case "it is sufficient to turn the scale"). Courts and commentators had
long employed commercial success and the other secondary considerations as indicia of
patentability. See Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1964); see also Edmund W. Kitch,
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 330-35
(examining the logical underpinnings of commercial success's relevance).
17. 383 U.S. i (first Supreme Court decision interpreting the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-
593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 1-376)).
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 17-18.
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In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases from any federal
district court. ° Congress aimed to create national uniformity in patent law,
which had previously suffered from circuit splits that distorted investment
decisions. For example, a company deciding where to build a factory that could
arguably infringe on a competitor's patent might choose a location within a
circuit with more favorable patent law jurisprudence.2' Commentators agree
that the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence has vastly increased the weight given to
22commercial success .
In one of its earliest rulings, the Federal Circuit found that a district court
committed reversible error by excluding consideration of commercial success 3
One commentator writes, "the Federal Circuit has transformed commercial
success from a tiebreaker to a virtual trump card."'" Moreover, "[s]everal
ao. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25, 37-39
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)).
21. The House Report concluded,
At present, the validity of a patient [sic] is too dependent upon geography (i.e.,
the accident of judicial venue) to make effective business planning possible. It is
particularly difficult for small businesses to make useful and knowledgeable
investment decisions where patents are involved when they fear a patent may be
tied up for years in expensive litigation and when the standard of patentability
varies from circuit to circuit. A single court of appeals for patent cases will
promote certainty where it is lacking to a significant degree and will reduce, if not
eliminate, the forum-shopping that now occurs.
H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22 (1981) (internal citations omitted). Congress also aimed to
relieve the workload of the regional circuits, id. at 27, and make better use of existing judicial
resources, id. at 24. See generally 4 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 11.o6[3][e][i] (2005 & Supp.
2005).
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003); Merges, supra note lo, at 820-26; Reed W.L.
Marcy, Note, Patent Law's Nonobviousness Requirement: The Effect of Inconsistent Standards
Regarding Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 199
(1996). Landes and Posner consider this trend odd, since commercial success helps
nontechnical judges make validity decisions, while the Federal Circuit has more technical
expertise than any other federal court. LANDES & POSNER, supra.
23. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
24. Merges, supra note io, at 827; see also Marcy, supra note 22, at 215-16; Dorothy Whelan,
Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondaty Considerations in Applying the Section 1o3
Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REv. 357, 358-59 (1987). Marcy also argues
that the Federal Circuit's commercial success jurisprudence harms predictability for small
individual inventors and leads to inefficiently high investment in developing existing
inventions rather than engaging in further research. Marcy, supra note 22, at 216-17.
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Federal Circuit judges have waged a prolonged campaign to discredit the
'secondary' label"2 assigned to factors such as commercial success by Graham.
B. Theoretical Justifications
Commercial success has huge practical advantages as a mode of proof in
patent litigation, particularly because of its accessibility to nontechnical judges
and juries. It also has strong theoretical justifications under the two economic
theories of patent law with the widest acceptance in scholarly writings and case
law: classical theory and prospect theory. 
6
25. Merges, supra note lo, at 834; see Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 331, 338-39 (1983) (calling them the "the misnamed 'secondary considerations"'
(emphasis added)); Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, i APLA
QOJ. 26, 38 (1972) ("There is just one unfortunate word in [Graham's secondary factors]
passage: 'secondary.' I don't think it should be given any weight though some courts seem
to have done so .... ").
26. There are actually five economic theories of patent law: rewards, patent-induced, prospect
theory, race-to-invent, and rent dissipation. See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified
Economic Theories of Patents- the Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996)
(discussing the various theories of patent law and investigating their predictions). The two
"classical" economic theories are the rewards theory and the patent-induced theory. These
theories are really two sides of the same coin, in that an incentive to invent ex ante becomes
an ex post reward for success. This Note consequently refers to the rewards theory and
patent-induced theory together as "the classical theory."
The classical and prospect theories are the most prominent in scholarly writings. See,
e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovationfrom Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New,
Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus.
L. 1, 14 (2000) (noting that classical reward-based theory and prospect theory are "the two
predominant economic theories of patents"). The classical theory has a long-standing basis
in the case law. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (adopting the patent-
induced theory by referring to "the inducement of the patent" (emphasis added)).
Scholars, however, have found that prospect theory also explains much of the Federal
Circuit's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent
Nonobviounesss Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1051, 1094-1100 (1991). In addition to producing reasoning and results fully consistent
with prospect theory, several Federal Circuit cases have cited directly to Edmund Kitch's
seminal 1977 article, Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1977), which first introduced prospect theory. E.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 640 (Fed. Cit. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), rev'd on other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Hilton Davis
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F. 3d 1512, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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1. Classical Theory
The classical economic theory of patents sees them as a mechanism for
inducing inventive activity and disclosure by providing the reward of
monopoly protection. The potential for commercial success presumably
provides incentives for others to try to perfect the invention, and the failure of
others to do so suggests nonobviousness. Put most simply, the classical theory-
based argument goes, "if an invention is both obvious and lucrative, why
wasn't it thought of earlier?"27
If one breaks down this reasoning into component parts, commercial
success implies nonobviousness with the aid of four inferences:
First, that the commercial success is due to the innovation. Second, that
if an improvement has in fact become commercially successful, it is
likely that this potential commercial success was perceived before its
development. Third, the potential commercial success having been
perceived, it is likely that efforts were made to develop the
improvement. Fourth, the efforts having been made by [persons skilled
in the field], they failed because the patentee was the first to reduce his
development to practice."
Arguably, the first inference-that the commercial success is due to the
patented invention -is the weakest of the four. Courts have responded to this
by requiring that a patentee show a nexus between the commercial success and
the patent itself.9 To have probative value, the commercial success cannot
result from nontechnical business prowess or from technical features not
covered in the patents-in-suit.3 0 For example, courts have found the nexus
severed by factors such as superior advertising, market power, or unpatented
features."' With these logical inferences and the requirement of a nexus,
commercial success provides a proxy for nonobviousness.
27. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 305.
28. Kitch, supra note 16, at 332.
29. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Solder Removal Co.
v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 582 F.2d 628, 637 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Note, however, that some
commentators think the Federal Circuit has not sufficiently heeded precedent about what
can negate a showing of nexus, such as marketing or business acumen. E.g., Merges, supra
note lo, at 827.
30. See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, S 5.05[2] [f] (reviewing cases finding and severing
nexus).
31. See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027 (1985). See generally 2
CHISUM, supra note 1S, § 5.O5[2] (f] [i].
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2. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory32 posits that the patent system acts like the system for
assigning mining rights to U.S. public lands.33 Just as granting mineral rights
on tracts over public lands encourages prospecting and mining, granting
property rights on an area of technology encourages its development.' Patents
give assurances of the exclusive right to develop and market a technology
without the danger of free riding by others.
For example, in 1976 the Supreme Court considered a patent on an
automated system for using water to clean cow droppings from barns.3" The
Court found the patent obvious as a simple use of water and automation.
Prospect theory would justify upholding the patent because it would have
enabled a manufacturer to invest in designing a marketable system and proving
its value to America's dairy farmers. Without the assurances of exclusivity
granted by a patent, a manufacturer would be less likely to make investments
in this socially beneficial system. Why invest in demonstrating the value of
automated cleanup to dairy farmers without assurances that others could not
sell cheaper versions of the same system once dairy farmers were sold on it?
Prospect theory strongly supports the use of commercial success to
demonstrate nonobviousness because it indicates that the patent serves as the
32. The prospect theory in patent law has no relation to the area of behavioral economics of the
same name. The former derives its name from analogy to mining prospects, whereas the
latter refers to how humans perceive the prospects of gains or losses. On the area of
behavioral economics called prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); and
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMEs (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
33. Kitch introduced this new theory in 1977, a decade after his landmark article on Graham. See
Kitch, supra note 26.
34. Prospect theory has faced a number of criticisms. See, e.g., Roger L. Beck, The Prospect
Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 193 (1983)
(challenging Kitch's assumptions that patents protect future developments); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1043 (1989) (finding no support for the theory in judicial decisions);
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After
Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353-57 (arguing that prospect theory has an unrealistic
view of inventors as risk-averse and incorrectly assumes that commercialization furthers
social good); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 9o COLUM. L. REv. 839, 868-76 (199o) ("The real problem is not controlling
overfishing, but preventing underfishing after exclusive rights have been granted."); Oddi,
supra note 26, at 282 (arguing that the theory has had no success in predicting the outcome
of individual patent cases).
35. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); see also Kitch, supra note 26, at 284 (discussing
Sakraida).
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"foundation for a series of now valuable contract rights" formed in reliance on
its validity. 6 Prospect theory accepts commercial success to prove patent
validity for normative, reliance-based reasons, not because commercial success
actually proves nonobviousness.37 Of course, prospect theory would still
require a showing of nexus to prove that the patented invention itself-not
extraneous factors-serves as the basis of the valuable contract rights. Some
commentators have suggested that prospect theory provides the underpinnings
for the expanded role of commercial success in the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence. 8
C. Critiques of Commercial Success
The convenience of commercial success for nontechnical fact-finders and its
grounding in theory have led to its increased use, but it has also drawn
significant scholarly criticism. In a 1966 article noting the four inferences39
required to deduce nonobviousness from commercial success, Professor
Edmund W. Kitch argues that each of these inferences could be quite weak.4"
Of course, courts have responded to the weakest of these inferences-that
commercial success is due to the claimed invention-by requiring proof of
nexus.4' Even here, however, Merges notes that the nexus requirement marked
a significant softening from the earlier requirement that the proof of a link must
be "positively clear ... that the commercial success asserted was the direct result"
of the invention.42
Merges also reviews theoretical models and empirical studies of invention
and innovation,43 finding that they undermine each of the four inferences
36. Kitch, supra note 26, at 283; see also Oddi, supra note 26, at 281-82 (providing an overview of
prospect theory).
37. See Merges, supra note lo, at 841 ("Kitch discards any worry about the inferential links
between market success and patentability; the fact that the invention has commercial value
means it is patentable.").
38. See Rhodes, supra note 26, at 1094-95. Prospect theory also supports strong patent rights in
general, Oddi, supra note 26, at 287, and commentators have found extensive evidence that
the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence has significantly strengthened the rights of patentees.
See, e.g., LANDES &POSNER, supra note 22, at 334-53.
3g. See supra Subsection I.B.i.
40. See Kitch, supra note 16, at 332.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
42. Merges, supra note lo, at 824 (quoting In re Heldt, 433 F.2d 808, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1970)); see
also id. at 833 ("[T]he Federal Circuit's nexus standard is hardly a model of clarity.").
43. Invention is the actual technological step forward. Innovation is the process of bringing a
working version of the invention to market. Id. at 807.
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between commercial success and nonobviousness. 44 For example, firms act on
incomplete information, with differing approaches to research and
development (R&D) and varying levels of responsiveness to market demands.4"
Firms with entrenched products will not find certain innovations profitable,
although other firms might.46 Competing researchers may proceed in different
directions, driven by academic pressures rather than financial incentives. 47
Overall, most scholarly attention on commercial success has attacked its use,
rather than addressing ways to improve its accuracy. 4s The courts, however,
continue to place great weight on commercial success, 49 and it remains a
heavily litigated issue.5"
44. Id. at 852-60.
45. Id. at 852-55, 86o. This undermines the second of the four inferences.
46. Id. at 855-56, 86o (citing Shelco v. Dow Chem. Co., 322 F. Supp. 485, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1970)).
This undermines the third of the four inferences. Merges also notes that the first firm to
invent (i.e., conceive of the solution) might not be the first to innovate (i.e., bring a
workable version of the invention to market). Id. at 860. This observation undermines the
fourth inference.
47. Id. at 857-58 (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1986)). Competitors without any profit motive completely upend the assumptions of
commercial success.
48. Id.; see, e.g., Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 11 (2004),
http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue2/vgi2_ao4-Depoorter.pdf; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
25 (2004) (noting "the Federal Circuit's practice of reserving its most outrageous
[commercial success] overreaching for those cases where a certiorari petition is unlikely");
Mandel, supra note 12, at 1423-25 (arguing that empirical evidence shows that commercial
success does not cure hindsight bias); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1111 (2003); Nathan
Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of
Section loi of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. L. REV. 421,446 (1999).
49. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d. 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (noting that commercial success is not mere icing on the cake); Stratoflex, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that a lower court's failure to
consider evidence of commercial success is reversible error).
50. See, e.g., Visto Corp. v. Smartner Info. Sys., No. 06-80339, No. o6-80352, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8481, at *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2007) (litigating discovery of commercial success
information); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 271 (D.N.J. 2006).
Following the lead of Learned Hand, Merges would weigh commercial success much less
than failure of others. The actual failure of others goes much more directly to
nonobviousness than does commercial success. Merges, supra note io, at 862-66,875.
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II. THE CURRENT MISGUIDED USE OF REVENUE DATA
Despite the growing importance of commercial success in patent cases,
courts use the wrong metrics for proving it. The Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence clearly holds that commercial success is "usually shown by
significant sales in a relevant market.""s Sales, of course, equal revenues. Courts
have also found other metrics related to revenue to be probative of commercial
success, including market share (i.e., revenue divided by market size) and unit
sales (i.e., revenue divided by unit price).52 By contrast, when opinions do refer
to profitability, they do so merely as an afterthought to revenue data.s" As a
result, lower courts typically do not permit discovery of profit data even in
cases centered on commercial success.
5 4
This Part begins by arguing that profits and not revenues should be the
measure of commercial success. It then considers what role a lack of profits
should have in the nonobviousness inquiry and concludes that a lack of profits
should exclude any consideration of commercial success entirely. This
conclusion has no value if patentees would never sue to enforce an unprofitable
patent, so the Part explains why holders of unprofitable patents do indeed have
incentives to bring suit. This Part finishes by suggesting possible explanations
for how revenue became so entrenched in the case law.
51. J.T. Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Ad. Paste & Glue Co., lO6 F.3 d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added); see also Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F. 3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal Mfg. & Sales Corp., 41 F. App'x 435, 440 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bose
Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3 d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 02-0512, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14724 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2004).
52. See, e.g., Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Cable Elec.
Prod., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (dismissing per-unit
profitability data as irrelevant).
53. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., 395 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1048 (D. Colo. 2005) (noting a
"gross profits estimation of $416,ooo" and "total gross sales at $2,331,o81.43"); Ortho-
McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 713, 756 (N.D. W. Va. 2004)
(mentioning "$5 billion in sales and more than $1 billion in profit" before continuing to
discuss sales trends).
S4. See, e.g., Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 56-57 (D.D.C.
1984) (refusing to compel answer to interrogatory question about profits because case law
does not find profits probative of commercial success); see also Dynacore Holdings Corp. v.
U.S. Philips Corp., No. 01 Civ. 5012, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18666, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4,
2002) (noting that "profit margins or other indicia of profitability" are not discoverable in
order to show commercial success).
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A. Profits Should Prove Commercial Success and Nonobviousness
Current commercial success jurisprudence works from the flawed
presumption that businesses aim to maximize revenue rather than profits. In
many - but not all - cases, higher revenues will indeed result in higher profits
for a firm, provided it can keep its costs sufficiently under control. As the two
following hypothetical situations demonstrate, however, in a number of
situations, measuring commercial success by revenue will lead to an incorrect
conclusion about nonobviousness.
i. Hypothetical: Lower Volume, Higher Price
Assume that the mousetrap market is highly competitive, with several
manufacturers, each selling three million mousetraps at one dollar apiece. With
average costs of $0.90 per trap, each manufacturer makes a profit of $o.io per
trap. All manufacturers have long strived to develop a better mousetrap, which
could sell in quantities of one million traps a year at two dollars apiece to those
consumers who have serious rodent problems.
Firm A's engineers manage to develop the better mousetrap, which A
patents. A determines it can maximize its profits by giving up building normal
mousetraps and using its existing plant to build one million of these better
mousetraps annually, and selling them at two dollars apiece. Production costs
for the better mousetrap will remain $0.90 per trap.
5 5
As a result of its better mousetrap, A's profits rise from three hundred
thousand dollars per year 6 to 1.1 million dollars per year,17 a nearly fourfold
increase. At the same time, its revenues have dropped from three million
dollarss8 to two million dollars59 as A goes "upscale." If one also assumes the
total dollar size of the mousetrap market remains constant, A's market share
has also fallen by one-third.6 °
A's competitors knew about the potential for a better mousetrap and had a
substantial profit incentive to develop it themselves, but failed. Courts should
s. This is a very reasonable assumption. Although there will be fewer units for spreading fixed
costs, marginal costs tend to decrease at lower levels of production due to less overtime, less
use of electricity at peak-rate periods, etc.
56. Three million mousetraps times $o.1o profit per mousetrap.
57. A price of two dollars with average costs of $0.90 yields $1.xo in profits per unit. Multiply
this profit by one million mousetraps produced annually.
58. Three million mousetraps at a price of one dollar per mousetrap.
sg. One million mousetraps at a price of two dollars per mousetrap.
6o. Three million dollars to two million dollars is a one-third drop.
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clearly infer nonobviousness from this situation. However, determining
commercial success by revenues or market share would prevent this inference.
2. Hypothetical: Lower Average Costs, Same Marginal Costs
Now consider the widget market and assume that it is also highly
competitive, with all widget manufacturers using effectively the same
manufacturing process. Widgets sell for one dollar apiece, with a breakdown of
$0.50 for electricity, $0.40 for other costs, and $o.1o of profit. Each
manufacturer sells one million widgets annually and maximizes its profits by
running its machinery eight hours a day.
Industry engineers had long known that it was theoretically possible to
reuse the condensation generated by one day's manufacturing to power the
first four hours of manufacturing the next day. Widget manufacturer X's
engineers finally perfect this environmentally friendly process and patent it.
Prior to this, X and all other widget manufacturers spent five hundred
thousand dollars a year on electricity. 6' Using the patented process to avoid
using electricity for four hours a day saves X two hundred fifty thousand
dollars annually on electricity.
62
Why doesn't X expand its hours of operation now that it has this process?
Because all businesses maximize profit by producing until the marginal cost of
each additional unit equals the marginal revenue. The new process only saves
electricity on the first four hours of operation, so the marginal cost to X of
expanding production from eight hours to nine hours does not change 63 and X
will keep production at eight hours to maximize profits.
With this new process, X's profits increase from one hundred thousand
dollars64 to three hundred fifty thousand dollars,6' but its revenues remain
constant at one million dollars. Again, although courts should infer
61. Fifty cents of electricity per unit times one million units per year.
62. Four hours is half of the eight hours that the machines are run, so the savings are half of five
hundred dollars.
63. For example, beyond eight hours the firm. might have to pay overtime to its workers or
nuisance compensation to residential neighbors who dislike manufacturing noise outside
business hours. Or, perhaps expanding production beyond one million units would involve
going onto a relatively expensive spot market to buy certain inputs, whereas the first one
million units are covered by a long-term contract at a good price.
64. Ten cents times one million units.
65. One hundred thousand dollars plus two hundred fifty thousand dollars in electricity
savings.
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nonobviousness, basing commercial success on revenue prevents this
inference.66
B. Lack of Profits Should Exclude Considerations of Commercial Success
The previous Section argued that courts should consider profitability as
proof of nonobviousness. The logical converse does not follow. Specifically, a
lack of profits does not tend to prove obviousness. The Federal Circuit has
properly held that lack of commercial success should not weigh toward
obviousness.6 7 This holding applies regardless of whether revenues or profits
prove commercial success.
Deducing obviousness from commercial failure requires two extremely
troublesome inferences.68 First, one must infer that the commercial failure
results from the invention's lack of potential. This inference is unreasonable, as
few patented inventions are immediately successful; rather, most require
extensive development to reach full marketability.6"
Second, one must infer that if no one else skilled in the field attempted to
develop the invention, the patentee succeeded because of the invention's
66. Of course, X could license its patent to other widget manufacturers for a royalty between
zero and two hundred fifty thousand dollars annually, but licensing is counted as a
secondary consideration separate from commercial success, which is the weightiest
secondary consideration. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson
Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But see EWP Corp. v. Reliance
Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 15,
§ 5.05[3] (discussing licensing as a secondary consideration). Moreover, if the widget
industry had some barriers to expanded production, the industry as a whole might still not
experience revenue growth for quite some time.
67. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Medtronic Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 739 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[T]he absence
of objective evidence is a neutral factor.")). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 15,
§ 5.o5[2][h].
68. Recall that inferring nonobviousness from commercial success requires four potentially
shaky inferences. See Kitch, supra note 16, at 332; see also supra Subsection I.B.I. To
investigate whether the reverse of the inference makes sense, we must consider the logical
negatives of the four inferences identified by Kitch. These logical negatives are: (1) the
commercial failure is due to the invention's lack of commercial potential; (2) if an
improvement has in fact become a commercial failure, it is likely that this potential failure
was perceived before its development; (3) the potential commercial failure having been
perceived, it is likely that no efforts were made to develop the improvement; and (4) no
efforts having been made by others skilled in the field, the patentee succeeded because of the
invention's obviousness. Inferences (1) and (4) are extremely problematic, for the reasons
discussed in the main text.
69. See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 134o (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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obviousness. This inference is also very weak. Indeed, the most nonobvious
patents sometimes emerge from areas no one else was considering because the
patent-holder was years ahead of the rest of the field. Pioneering patents often
result in commercial failure70 because they depend on other technologies that
have either not yet matured or are prohibitively expensive.
71
Lack of profits does, however, have a proper role in showing lack of
commercial success and lack of a nexus between the invention and purported
commercial success.72 In other words, a lack of profits should be a completely
neutral factor, acting only to remove any consideration of commercial success
from the case. The fact-finder should evaluate an unprofitable patent's
nonobviousness upon its technical or scientific merits, as well as the other
secondary considerations, without any commercial success data. Removing
commercial success from consideration due to the absence of profits does not
require the two extremely troublesome inferences noted above. Moreover, this
limited conclusion makes sense under both prospect theory and the classical
theory.73
1. Classical Theory Sees No Success, No Nexus, and Negated Inferences
The classical theory dictates that a lack of profits should remove any
consideration of commercial success for three reasons. First, in the business
world, commercial success is profitability, not revenues. In other words, a
court should not properly even find commercial success in the absence of
profits.
70. Commercial failure typically implies lack of either revenues or profits.
71. See EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS or THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 30-31
(1951); Oddi, supra note 26, at 275.
72. For more on the potential inferences from lack of profitability, see Richard L. Robbins,
Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 1169, 1177 (1964). Robbins argues that commercial failure at least rebuts any possible
inference of "long-felt need," another of the "secondary considerations" mentioned in
Graham and heavily employed by the Federal Circuit. Lack of profits could similarly be used
to rebut "failure of others," also listed as a secondary consideration in Graham. Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
73. In some circumstances, an unforeseeable event will significantly reduce revenues or increase
costs for a previously profitable product. In these cases, a court might decide to allow the
patentee to submit evidence that but for the event, it would have been profitable. The
standard of proof for accepting such evidence, however, should be substantially higher than
the "preponderance of the evidence" used to show nonobviousness. "Clear and convincing
evidence" suggests itself as a possibility. The court should also consider whether the product
would have been profitable if the costs of proper hedging and insurance were factored in.
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Second, a lack of profitability severs the nexus that the case law requires
between alleged commercial success and the patented invention.74 Courts have
found a number of possible factors to sever this nexus, including advertising,75
dominant market position,76 and superior workmanship.' Consider a product
that experiences commercial success as currently defined- substantial
revenues - but loses money. The patentee has thus charged less than the cost of
production. This unprofitable underpricing provides an alternative explanation
for the substantial revenues, at least as authoritative as good advertising or
superior workmanship.
Third, recall from Subsection I.B.1 that deducing nonobviousness from
commercial success requires four separate inferences 78 The third inference is
that "the potential commercial success having been perceived, it is likely that
efforts were made to develop the improvement." 79 As discussed above, profits,
not revenues, motivate business choices, including efforts to develop an
improvement. If an invention turns out to be unprofitable then the likelihood
increases that others perceived the unprofitability and did not invest in
developing improvements increases. Any inference of nonobviousness is hence
improper.
Although it seems completely intuitive that the absence of profits should
negate any showing of nonobviousness through commercial success, no case
law has established this proposition. This disparity came to the forefront in a
recent unpublished Federal Circuit opinion, Medpointe Healthcare, Inc. v. Hi-
Tech Pharmacal Co.s° The two-judge majority found it self-evident that a
74. This is the first of the four inferences mentioned in Subsection I.B.1.
75. McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Patentee]
launched a massive marketing and advertising campaign in connection with the launch of
[the product], obscuring any nexus that might have existed between the merits of the
product and its commercial success.").
76. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295, 300 (9 th Cir. 1970)
(recognizing market position as a secondary consideration).
7. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
7s. The four required inferences were: (i) the commercial success is due to the innovation (i.e.,
the existence of nexus); (2) if an improvement has in fact become commercially successful, it
is likely that this potential commercial success was perceived before its development; (3) the
potential commercial success having been perceived, it is likely that efforts were made to
develop the improvement; (4) efforts having been made by [persons skilled in the field],
they failed because the patentee was the first to reduce his development to practice. Kitch,
supra note 16, at 332.
79. Id.
8O. 115 F. App'x 76 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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patent's lack of profitability negated any showing of commercial success. 81
Chief Judge Mayer vehemently dissented, writing, "I have been unable to find
any case that suggests that a product was commercially unsuccessful because it
had only broken even at the time of inquiry.s2
2. Prospect Theory Sees Worthless "Contract Rights"
Bear in mind that prospect theory would lead courts to place great weight
on commercial success because it indicates that the patent forms the
"foundation for a series of now valuable contract rights.""3 The value of a
contract right to its holder and to the economy depends on its profitability. A
patent that generates no profits serves as the basis for contract rights that
generate no societal surplus,8 4 removing the prospect theory-based argument
for upholding the patent.
To employ prospect theory's analogy, consider a plot of land under which
the lessee has discovered gold. For each of the twenty years of the lease, the
lessee expects to extract one million dollars worth of gold, at the cost of one
million dollars in labor, equipment, and pollution-control. The lessee's
activities generate zero benefit to the lessee or to society. Hence, society would
be no worse off if the government simply canceled the lease." The same
reasoning applies to unprofitable patent rights.
81. Id. at 8o.
82. Id. at 82 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
83. Kitch, supra note 26, at 283; see also supra Subsection I.B.2.
84. Of course, a patent may have significant positive externalities on society that the patentee
does not capture. For example, a patent might indicate a broad new set of approaches to
addressing an old problem. These externalities, however, do not bear on the value of the
contract rights founded on the patent.
85. There may be transaction costs involved with returning the labor and capital to other uses.
In the patent context, however, the transaction costs involved with simply enforcing a
patent are usually very high. Raymond Van Dyke, Functional Economics: The New Language
in Computing Lost Profits, 34 AIPLA .J.. 195, 215 n.115 (2006) (citing AIPLA REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 2005, at 22 (2005)) (observing that the typical cost of "litigation fees" for
a simple patent case is three hundred fifty thousand dollars, and complicated, higher-
damages cases range from six hundred fifty thousand dollars to 4.5 million dollars, typically
costing three million dollars). The savings from avoiding additional patent enforcement
might well outweigh the transaction costs of reallocating the labor and capital tied to an
invalidated patent.
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C. Why Sue To Enforce an Unprofitable Patent?
The previous Section reached an actionable conclusion for courts: exclude
any consideration of commercial success for an unprofitable patent. For this
conclusion to have any value, this Note must show that patentees would sue to
enforce an unprofitable patent in the first place. Patent law provides for
damages typically equal to profits lost by the patentee because of the
infringement.8 6 On its face, this seems to make the issue of how to handle
unprofitable patents moot. If a patent proved unprofitable for its owner, then
its infringement would yield zero damages, discouraging patent litigation in
the first place. A closer look at damages calculations and other available
remedies, however, shows that holders of unprofitable patents often will have
strong incentives to sue infringers.
In assessing damages for patent infringement, profits generally mean
marginal profits that would have accrued from producing the additional
units.87 Courts ignore fixed costs in profitability determinations.88 This choice
makes sense in that it awards to the plaintiff the money it would have made but
for the defendant's infringement. For example, it means that a patentee with an
unprofitable product with high fixed costs but low marginal costs could
recover damages of nearly its full sale price per lost unit in damages. Suing to
enforce unprofitable patents can thus net substantial sums of money.
Consider the following hypothetical involving a software program to
manage the manufacture of widgets. Both companies A and B develop software
for widget makers, and both recognize the potential for a new software process
to run it. Company B talks to some of its customers and realizes that the
process is an obvious next step and that many widget makers will want their
in-house engineers to develop the software. In contrast, A does not talk to its
customers, and hence does not realize the obviousness of the process. A then
86. The other two possible measures of damages are established royalties and hypothetical
royalties. See generally 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, 5 20.03 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (describing the
three measures of damages for patent infringement).
87. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("The incremental income approach to the computation of lost profits is well established in
the law relating to patent damages."); see also 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 20.0311] [d] [ii]
(2002 & Supp. 2005). Judge Easterbrook, known for his strong law and economics
reasoning, has realized that this simplifies matters too much. In one case, he based damages
on the shape of the demand curve. In re Mahurkar Double Luman Hemodialysis Catheter
Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
88. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d at 22.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
patents the process, 8 and invests one million dollars in developing the
software based on it.
However, A sells only fifty installations at ten thousand dollars per
installation for total revenues of five hundred thousand dollars. For each
installation sold, A has an average loss of five thousand dollars but a marginal
profit of ten thousand dollars, since it costs nothing to create another copy of an
already-written software program.9" If A successfully sues a group of widget-
makers who developed their own version, it will get damages of ten thousand
dollars per lost installation. Incidentally, if A also wins a permanent injunction
against the widget-makers, it could threaten temporarily to shut down the
defendants' operations, extracting substantially more. 91 A widget-maker would
be willing to pay up to its full expected profits to buy off an injunction that
otherwise might shut down production while its engineers retool to work
around the patent.
Using marginal profits to measure damages gives patentees an especially
strong incentive to sue to enforce unprofitable patents in industries with low
marginal costs. These industries include software and pharmaceuticals.
Disturbingly, Company A in the hypothetical above could have intended this
result all along, knowing that the patent was likely obvious but planning on
using it to push its software on widget-makers. 92 Alternatively, A could have
had mixed motives, hoping to produce a profit without resorting to threats of
patent litigation, but keeping it as a backup option.
Other factors also increase the value of suing for damages on an
unprofitable patent. First, any reasonable doubt in the measure of damages is
resolved in favor of the plaintiff.93 Second, defendants' trial counsel cannot
89. The PTO often issues patents on inventions that later litigation determines are obvious. See
Allison & Lemley, supra note 3.
go. Concededly, this hypothetical is somewhat simplified because additional installations would
likely involve some marginal costs, such as sales commissions, product manuals, and
support.
91. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (20o6) (holding that courts should
not issue permanent injunctions against infringers as a matter of right, but only if the
traditional four-factor equity test for permanent injunctions dictates an injunction). Justice
Kennedy's concurrence remarked that the threat of an injunction "can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees." Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Company B in the hypothetical above might have also recognized this possibility but
decided against it because of scruples or fear of alienating widget makers who bought
another of its products.
93. See Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Any doubts
regarding the calculatory precision of the damage amount must be resolved against the
infringer.").
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make too much of their case against large damages awards without appearing
to the jury to admit to the infringement in the first place. 94 Third, 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 expressly provides that damages shall "in no event [be] less than a
reasonable royalty .... ."9' This section provides an alternative measure of
damages that acts as a minimum floor, ensuring that patentees have incentives
to sue on many otherwise unprofitable patents.
D. Origins of Commercial Success as Revenues
Given the wide acceptance that profits, and not revenues, motivate business
decisions, 96 why did jurisprudence come to rely upon revenues? No published
opinion known to the author actually explains the decision to use revenues
instead of profits, and the judges who first interpreted Graham are no longer
available to explain their reasoning, making any answers necessarily
speculative. One possibility is that many judges come from private practice,
where partner compensation has increasingly been determined by revenue
generation. 97 It is also possible that the judges who first introduced revenue as
the primary measure were not schooled in law and economics. Indeed, Graham
came down in 1966 as the law and economics movement was in its nascence. 9s
An intriguing alternative explanation is that American businesses paid
more attention to revenues forty years ago than they do now. In 1959, seven
years before Graham, economist William J. Baumol put forth the "Revenue
Maximization Hypothesis."99 He posited that structural and incentive factors,
such as a distaste for laying off employees,' made many executives focus on
increasing revenues once they had achieved a minimum acceptable profit
94. Juries often act in a seemingly irrational manner when awarding damages in patent cases.
See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 136o, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (finding that a $5.93 million award was not "speculative" despite the fact that "neither
party can ascertain exactly how it was calculated").
95. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
96. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw lo (6th ed. 2003).
91. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 157
(2002). One could object that the "eat what you kill" system had not yet become the
dominant model by the 196os, but revenue concerns had always been on the minds of law
firm partners. The current focus of law firms on revenue is unmistakable, and certainly
helps explain the continued vitality of revenues in commercial success jurisprudence.
98. As just one of many possible examples, Richard Posner published the first edition of his first
book, Economic Analysis of Law, fully seven years after Graham. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAw (lst ed. 1972).
99. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-53 (1959).
oo. Id. at 46.
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level."' Baumol wrote, "Surely it is common experience that, when one asks an
executive, 'How's business?', he will answer that his sales have been increasing
(or decreasing), and talk about his profit only as an afterthought, if at all.""0 2
This answer could easily have come from the published opinions of many
federal judges. When asked, "How commercially successful is this patentee?"
judges write of increasing or decreasing sales, with profits only mentioned as
an afterthought, if at all. "3
Starting in the 1930s, the profit-maximizing incentives of the managers of
publicly traded corporations weakened "as corporations had become larger,
management ownership had shrunk and shareholders had become more widely
dispersed.' '0 4 This trend reversed in the 198os and 199os, with a number of
changes in corporate governance, including the use of hostile takeovers to
remove underperforming managers,' the rise of shareholder activism, °6 and,
above all, the increase in incentive-based CEO compensation such as stock
options.'0 7 The press lionizes managers, like former General Electric CEO Jack
Welch, who excel at maximizing their company's expected profit streams, as
reflected in their stock price. , 8 Corporate law around the world is increasingly
moving toward putting profits and shareholders first. 9 Whatever one's
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 47.
103. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
104. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the
United States: Making Sense of the 198os and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 121, 129
(discussing several works by Michael C. Jensen).
ios. See id.
1o6. Id. at 134-35.
107. Id. at 133.
1o8. See, e.g., The Revolutionary Spirit, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 17, 17 (praising General
Electric's then-CEO Jack Welch, under whom the company's share price rose "thirryfold").
iog. See, e.g., id. ("If the past decade has had a single theme, it has been the transformation of
American capitalism. This is seen not just in record profits at American firms ... it is more
visible still in companies around the world falling over themselves to ape the American way
.... Michelin, once the epitome of the French, state-supported way, has caused outrage by
proposing to cut its workforce even when profits are healthy."). This is relevant because
roughly half of all patents issued by the U.S. PTO have listed inventors residing outside the
United States. See PTO, Patent Counts by Country/State and Year (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cst-ud.pdf (noting that 83,948 of the 173,771 patents issued in
2006 listed nonresident inventors); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End
of Historyfor Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that most countries' corporate
law will converge toward a "standard model" of U.S.-style shareholder control). Hansmann
and Kraakman do not even consider America to have been shareholder-centric in the 195os
and 196os, being "manager-oriented" rather than shareholder-oriented. Id. at 443-44.
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ideological take on corporations' current relentless focus on earnings and stock
prices, few would think their managers' version of commercial success is
revenue.
Publicly traded corporations, of course, do not commercialize all patents.
Venture capital has exploded since Graham from virtually nothing ° to raising
new capital at an annualized rate of twenty-nine billion dollars per year as of
this writing,"' while financing the commercialization of an increasing portion
of U.S. innovation."2 Venture capital funds are structured to provide very
strong incentives for their managers to focus on profitability, typically paying
managers twenty percent of the fund's profits."' Fund managers keep close
control over the ventures they finance, maximizing long-term profit streams,
which determine the price the venture will fetch upon resale or public stock
offering."4 This incentive scheme leads venture capital funds, like CEOs, to
keep a strong focus on profits, a focus that judges should recognize by moving
toward using profits as the measure of commercial success.
III. IMPLEMENTING PROFITS AS COMMERCIAL SUCCESS
Profits equal revenues minus costs. This relationship highlights two
potential drawbacks to using profits instead of revenues to prove or disprove
commercial success. First, determining profitability requires calculating costs,
which requires additional calculation. Second, since costs - like revenues - can
be manipulated, additional potential for "fuzzy numbers" enters the picture.
110. See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 1 (2d ed. 2004)
(describing annual inflows at virtually zero in the mid-197os, nearly a decade after Graham).
iii. See Press Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n & Thomson Fin., Venture Capital
Fundraising Activity Healthy and Prudent in Second Quarter of 2007 (July 16, 2007),
available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q2o7VCFundraisingfinal.pdf (reporting $7.2 billion
in the second quarter of 2007, which annualizes to a rate of $28.8 billion). Of course, inflows
were considerably higher at the peak of the dot-com boom in 2000. GOMPERS & LERNER,
supra note 1io, at i (reporting inflows of $1os billion in 2000).
11. See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 11o, at 306 (estimating that by 1998, "venture funding
accounted for about fourteen percent of U.S. innovative activity," and finding that venture
capital has had a significant positive impact on patenting); see also Holmstrom & Kaplan,
supra note 104, at 136-37 (locating increasing use of venture capital in a trend of
decentralization in the U.S. economy); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of
Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 482 (1990) (listing some notable venture
capital-backed successes).
113. GOMPERS &LERNER, supra note 11o, at 91; Sahlman, supra note 112, at 491.
114. See Sahlman, supra note 112, at 5o6-1o.
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Neither of these two drawbacks should prevent using profits instead of
revenues. Courts have significant experience in determining profits in many
other situations, including assessing patent damages.' 5 Corporate scandals
such as Xerox's have shown the extreme susceptibility of revenue to
manipulation., 6 Moreover, companies typically already retain the appropriate
profitability records for other purposes.
This Part considers the practical aspects of having courts use profits rather
than revenue to determine commercial success. It first details how courts
should measure profits in the simplest case, where the firm in question markets
only the patented invention. It then looks at how the accounting extends to the
more complex situation where the patentee has multiple products. It then
argues that the changes from revenues to profits would not create more work
for courts and could even increase judicial efficiency. The Part concludes by
noting that using profits does not create any perverse incentives.
A. Simplest Case: Firm Only Markets the Patented Invention
In the simplest case, a court must determine the profitability of a patentee
who sells only products embodying the patented invention. Looking at the
measures of profitability in this case will help clarify what measures to use in
more complicated situations. Issues to consider include the appropriate
timeframe, whether to include development costs, how to handle
nondeveloped fixed costs, and what the benchmark should be.
First, over what timeframe should courts look to determine profitability?
Many cases dealing with commercial success as revenue focus on annual
numbers in the latest available year." 7 This timeframe makes sense for a
115. Of course, courts recognize the fact that economic profits -the ideal to be used under either
classical or prospect theory-often differ widely from accounting profits. See, e.g., Telerate
Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
116. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Xerox Corp., No. 02-272789 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17465.htm (detailing how Xerox
manipulated its revenues).
117. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (annual
sales of one hundred million dollars); Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476,
1482 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (annual sales of forty-eight million dollars); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix
Drug Sales, Inc., 46o F.2d 1O96, 1099 ( 5th Cir. 1972) (current annual rate of sales exceeding
sixty-five million dollars). Many other cases focus on lifetime sales. See, e.g., Symbol Techs.,
Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (one hundred and fifty million
dollars of total sales); Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 679 F.2d 11Ol, 1104
(4 th Cir. 1982) (total sales volume of approximately one hundred and sixty-two million
dollars); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436 F.2d 118o, 1187 (7th Cir. 1971)
(several billion cups sold).
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number of reasons: it provides a large sample size, seasonal variations cancel
out over the course of a year, and financial and tax reporting numbers are
audited every year. Alternatively, courts could look to the entire lifetime of the
invention, from the firm's decision to pursue developing it through the
present. Which makes the most sense?
Lack of profitability over an annual period should definitely negate any
inference of commercial success from high revenue numbers or market share
over the same year. As demonstrated in Subsection II.B.1, a lack of profitability
severs the nexus between the merits of the invention and any other indicators
of commercial success. Unprofitability indicates that the revenue or market
share numbers resulted from setting the price to an unprofitable and hence
unsustainable amount. This inference holds true over any discrete time period,
whether a year, quarter, or decade.
Classical theory and prospect theory differ on what timeframe a patentee
must look at affirmatively to prove commercial success. Classical theory, with its
focus on inducing rational agents to invent, would require a patentee to show
profitability in net present value over the entire period from the start of
development through the present. 1,8 Recall that inferring nonobviousness from
commercial success requires an inference that the potential of the invention
drew others to attempt to develop the invention. Economic theory predicts that
firms make decisions based on the net present value of that decision. Looking
back to the start of development should not pose a huge evidentiary problem,
since patents only last twenty years from the application date.
Prospect theory would allow a patentee to show profitability over a much
shorter timeframe, such as a year. This timeframe would best approximate the
current value of the contract rights founded upon the validity of the patent, the
same contract rights that prospect theory uses to justify using commercial
success in the first place.1 9 Whether a court decides to adopt a lifetime or
annual approach should depend on whether it prefers the prospect or classical
theory, as well as evidentiary availability and judicial economy.
Second, courts should definitely include all of the costs of developing the
patented invention into a marketable product. To see why, consider the absurd
results if they did not: patents in industries with high development costs and
low marginal costs would always appear profitable. This standard would find
11s. Ideally, a court could determine the full measure of profits generated from the patented
invention, but that would involve forecasting the future, a pursuit for which courts are badly
suited.
tig. See supra Subsection I.B.2 (discussing why prospect theory leads to the conclusion of
commercial success being relevant).
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virtually all software and pharmaceutical patents nonobvious because much of
the cost of products in those industries lies in their development.
If a court decided to use annual profit numbers, it would have to allocate
some portion of the development costs to that year. The logical accounting
approach is to amortize the development costs across the life of the patent,
allocating a portion of the up-front development costs to each later year during
which the patentee actually benefits from its investment. Both international
accounting standards 2' and U.S. tax accounting12' actually require this
treatment of development costs and could provide a starting point.
Third, it goes without saying that variable costs should factor into the
profitability decision. Whether to include nondevelopment fixed costs, such as
the machines used to manufacture the patented widgets or the salaries of
widget engineers, presents a harder question. Classical theory would simply
count these toward the overall profitability of the invention, since such costs
would have factored into the decisions of others to attempt to develop the
patent.
Prospect theory, which supports the use of commercial success because it
indicates valuable contract rights founded on the patent, would also count
fixed costs. Fixed costs virtually always involve contract rights, either explicitly
or implicitly, and hence factor into the value of the overall contract rights
founded on the patent. For example, a capital lease or loan taken out to
purchase widget-manufacturing equipment factors explicitly into the current
value of the contract rights. Alternatively, any owner's equity that went into
purchasing widget-manufacturing equipment involves an implicit contract
whereby the firm intends to earn a return on that investment.
Finally, the bar for finding profitability should not be zero. Instead, it
should be the typical returns in the relevant industry for comparable projects.'
For example, consider an oil refining company that patented an improved
refining process at the same time that the demand for refined oil products
skyrocketed, boosting the profits of all refineries. The proper test for whether
the refining process was a commercial success should be neither zero nor the
120. International Accounting Standard 38 permits amortization of development costs if certain
criteria are met. International Accounting Standard Committee, International Accounting
Standard 38 (1998), reprinted in 2003 O.J. (L 261) 258, 336-60, available at http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2oo3/L 261/l_2612oo31o13eno258o385.pdf; see also Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu, IAS Plus International Accounting Standards IAS 38, Intangible Assets,
http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias38.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
121. See 26 U.S.C. § 263A (2000).
122. Effectively, this results in a measurement of whether there is a profit from an economic
point of view, which would deduct the opportunity cost of the invested capital.
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average cost of capital. Rather, it should be the average level of profitability
within the industry.
B. Multiple Products
The accounting becomes more complicated when the patent in question
does not cover all of a firm's products or services. The question arises of how to
allocate fixed costs. For example, consider a firm that produces product X,
covered by the patent in question, and product Y, not covered by the patent.
The firm manufactures both X and Y in the same factory on many of the same
machines. How should a court allocate the cost of the factory, the machines,
and the maintenance of those machines between products X and Y?
A whole field of accounting-cost accounting- addresses this very issue.
These issues of allocation are fundamental to financial reporting, tax
accounting,'23 and the internal accounting that supports management
decisions. As a result, a firm must have already prepared these numbers in
preparing its financial statements,'" determining its taxes, and making
production decisions. For the first two purposes, these numbers conform to
relevant rules and are audited. For the third purpose, of supporting
management decisions, a firm with inaccurate cost allocation would make
improper decisions about production volume, price, or a whole range of other
business variables.1
25
123. See 26 U.S.C. § 263A (2000) (uniform capitalization rules). See generally DAVID H.
MARSHALL, WAYNE M. McMANus & DANIEL F. VIELE, AccouNTING 484-526 (7th ed. 2005)
(discussing cost accounting).
124. Even nonpublic companies must generally produce audited financial statements. For
example, firms receiving venture capital must provide audited financial statements to their
investors. Similarly, firms seeking debt financing from banks or the bond market generally
must also provide audited financial statements. See MARSHALL ET AL., supra note 123, at 18.
125. It is always possible that a firm fudged these numbers in anticipation of patent litigation
where commercial success might play a role. Financial reporting and tax reporting rules,
however, put constraints on manipulation. Additionally, if the firm manipulated its internal
management cost accounting numbers, its management decisions would seem irrational.
For example, if the firm in the example above consistently attempted to allocate an undue
share of the costs to the unpatented product Y, which presumably faces normal market
pressures, then Ywould likely consistently have returns below the firm's cost of capital. This
situation would make the firm's decision to keep producing Y very suspect, which could
indicate the need for an adjustment of cost away from Y toward X for the purposes of the
litigation.
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C. Factors Mitigating the Impact on Judicial Economy
The two measures of damages used in the majority of patent infringement
cases-"lost profits" and "reasonable royalty"- require courts to calculate
profit figures."' As a result, a court that calculates profit numbers once in
determining the presence or absence of commercial success could save time at a
later stage of the litigation. These savings further mitigate any additional
judicial burden from using profits in place of revenues.
The "lost profits" measure of damages involves calculation of the cost
structure of the relevant product. A court would have already investigated this
in determining profitability for commercial success. When the patentee or
infringer produces multiple products, courts have to determine issues of cost
allocation. 27 A court that had already determined profitability for purposes of
commercial success would have already investigated and determined how to
allocate costs.
The "reasonable royalty" measure of damages requires the court to consider
the fifteen factors described in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp."28 No
fewer than four of these fifteen factors involve the existence or degree of overall
profitability. 9 Unlike the "lost profits" measure, which generally only requires
126. See 7 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 20.03 (2002 & Supp. 2005) (discussing monetary relief).
Courts sometimes use a third measure of damages, "established royalty," which does not
involve a court investigation into profitability. See id. § 20.03[2] (discussing established
royalty damages). An unscientific review of Federal Circuit cases in LexisNexis finds 217
mentions of "lost profits" and 205 mentions of "reasonable royalty," as compared with only
36 mentions of "established royalty." This suggests that a solid majority of patent cases
involve one of the two measures of damages that do require a computation of profitability.
127. Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[D]amages
are limited to that part of the profits, which must be apportioned as between those created
by the patent and those not so created .... ); see also Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp.,
283 U.S. 27 (1931) (denying damages based on profits lost from sale of unpatented product
related to patented product).
128. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and affd sub nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing Georgia-Pacific, 318 F.
Supp. at 1116).
129. The four Georgia-Pacific factors involving profits include the following:
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
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an understanding of marginal profits,3 ° all four of these imply an
understanding of overall profitability, taking into account total fixed and
variable costs. Total profits are taken into account regardless of whether the
patentee or infringer achieved the profits in question. '3
Furthermore, a court lacking the expertise to determine profitability could
easily delegate this task to a special master. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explicitly contemplate submitting accounting questions to special
masters, and extensive case law arising from a variety of substantive areas of
law has clarified many aspects of this procedure.'32 District courts dealing with
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
amount which a prudent licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (emphasis added). All four factors imply an
understanding of overall profits to be reaped from the patented invention. For example,
with relation to factor fifteen, no licensee would pay anything to license a patent when the
fixed and variable costs of usage exceeded the revenues it could bring in.
Factor eight appears to contemplate precisely the same measure of profitability that this
Note argues should apply to commercial success, including development costs. Factors
twelve, thirteen, and fifteen seem to contemplate the potential profitability once the patentee
has fully developed the invention up to the point that it is ready for licensing.
13o. For more detailed analysis, see Judge Easterbrook's discussion of lost profits in In re
Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litigation, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1383-94
(N.D. Ill. 1993).
131. See Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 199o). In Trell, the Federal
Circuit noted that "[i]n determining the result of such a hypothetical negotiation, the
district court may consider the infringer's anticipated profits, as indicated by evidence of
actual profits." Id. (emphasis added). This wording implies overall profitability, including
fixed and variable costs.
132. See FED. R. Ciw. P. 53(a)(1)(B)(ii) ("[A] court may appoint a master to ... hold trial
proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided by the court
without a jury if appointment is warranted by... the need to perform an accounting or resolve
a difficult computation of damages .... " (emphasis added)); see, e.g., Smith v. Dental Prods.
Co., 168 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1948) (death of a master). The eighty-two pages of annotations
for FED. R. Ciw. P. 53 provided in 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1992 & Supp. 2007) also illustrate this
point.
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patent suits have long submitted accounting issues regarding damages to
special masters. 33 Indeed, courts have also delegated a number of technical
patent issues' 4 to special masters, suggesting that district courts feel quite
comfortable doing so.
D. Judicial Economies, Including Requiring a Threshold Profitability Showing
This Note concluded in Section II.B that a lack of profits negates any
possible inference of commercial success. Judges could turn this conclusion
into a time-saving evidentiary requirement that a patentee must make a
preliminary showing of profitability before considering any commercial success
or nexus-related discovery, motions, or evidence admission. Putting this
burden on the patentee makes sense, as the patentee typically will have the
easiest access to the relevant accounting data.
In those cases where the patentee failed to meet the burden of showing
profitability, the trial court would no longer have to hear evidence and
arguments based on commercial success. Also, recall that courts normally
determine commercial success by "significant sales in a relevant market."'35
Using profitability instead would avoid the determination of either the
"relevant" market or what constitutes "significant" sales. In the absence of
profits, moreover, a court would have no need to expend significant resources
on the vexing question of whether a nexus exists.I6
133. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (reviewing reasonable royalty calculated by a master); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros.
Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he accuracy of the patent owner's
accounting method is a 'matter to be decided on the basis of testimony in the hearing before
the Master."' (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 415 F.2d 1o68, 1075 (6th Cir.
1969))). On the importance of profits to damages, see supra Section III.C.
134. See, e.g., Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (delegating the issue of whether the on-sale bar invalidated claims); Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 584 (Fed. Cit. 2ooo) (doctrine of
equivalents), rev'd on other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Mead
Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cit. 2000) (level of skill in the art); Desper Prods., Inc. v.
QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (claim construction); Newman v. Quigg,
877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (patentability itself);
Power Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, Nos. 2:99CV168-DF, 2:OOCV2o8-DF, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27560, at *37-38 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002) (claim construction).
135. See sources cited supra note 51.
136. Indeed, determining the existence of a nexus appears to be quite difficult. For example,
Chisum devotes significantly more space to the case law regarding nexus than to the
existence of commercial success itself. Compare 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 5.05[2] [f], with id.
S 5.05[2] [b]-(2] [e].
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E. Using Profits Creates Few Incentives To Be Inefficient
The parallels between patent and antitrust law run deep'3 7: a patent is, after
all, a government-granted monopoly of sorts.' 38 Profitability acts as a
"secondary consideration" in antitrust as well, providing objective but indirect
indicia of market power.' 9 Critics of antitrust law's use of profits as proof
point to its potentially perverse incentives, encouraging firms with market
power to squander resources to appear less profitable and avoid antitrust
liability.1 40 Using profitability in patent law would have the opposite effect on
patentees and their licensees: they have every incentive to pursue efficiency in
the hopes of proving commercial success in future litigation.
Of course, an infringer's commercial success can also be used by a patentee
to show the patent's nonobviousness. For example, in Gambro Lundia AB v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp. '141 the patentee proved the commercial success of a
patent on hemodialysis by noting that the infringer (i.e., the defendant) had
sold 14,8oo dialysis machines embodying the patent. 42 Facing such a situation,
infringers would indeed appear to have incentives to squander resources to
appear less profitable and hence avoid a finding of nonobviousness.
Three factors mitigate the impact of this incentive. First and most
importantly, most cases involve the commercial success of the patentee, not the
infringer. 143 Second, any infringer who acts on these incentives faces an
increased chance of being found a willful infringer, liable for treble damages.'44
Third, patent terms last only twenty years, ensuring only a limited period of
137. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1813
(1984); George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 309
(1977). But see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 5 18(b) (2d
ed. 2002) (noting that lower courts have been moving away from presuming market power
from patent tights).
138. In the future, judges, practitioners, and scholars in patent law might look to antitrust law to
further develop their understanding of commercial success. For example, antitrust has
developed several methods of measuring market power that courts could use to measure
how much a patented invention differentiates a product from the rest of the market. This is
a promising area for future research.
139. AREEDA& HOVENKAMP, supra note 137, 516.
140. See id. 516f 3 (taking the "quiet life" over profits).
141. 11o F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
142. Id. at 1579; see also Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Paragon Optical Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1oo1,
1005 (D. Ariz. 1987) (measuring commercial success by sales of the infringer and patentee).
143. 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 5.05[2] [g].
144. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000); see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (noting that willfulness typically merits treble damages).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
wastefulness at most. Overall, using profits to measure commercial success
would improve the efficiency of incentives, if it changes them at all.
IV. AN ALTERNATE NORMATIVE REASON TO USE REVENUE
Part II of this Note argued that profits should supplant revenues as the
measure of commercial success in showing nonobviousness. This Part
considers a normative economic counterargument, which weighs in favor of
keeping revenues as the measure of commercial success.
A. Normative Argument
Commentators and economists have long recognized that the patent system
involves a tradeoff. Society gives patentees a limited-term monopoly, which
allows the patentee to raise prices above marginal costs to extract monopoly
rents. This monopoly has attendant costs in terms of deadweight loss
(potential utility which goes to neither the producer nor the consumer) and
lessened consumer surplus (because the product gets to fewer consumers, at a
higher price). In return, individuals and organizations get an incentive to
produce valuable inventions. 45
Consider a typical market, where marginal costs are above zero for every
unit sold (i.e., producing an additional unit for sale costs additional money). If
the patentee is completely unworried about patent validity, the figure below
demonstrates how the patentee (or its licensees) will behave. It sells at the
profit-maximizing price, where marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue
(MR). This price is above the socially optimal price, which is where the
additional cost of producing one unit equals what a consumer will pay for it. '46
In this way, using revenues as the proof of commercial success encourages
firms to set a price below the profit-maximizing monopoly price, thereby
minimizing the deadweight loss to society and increasing consumer surplus. In
other words, jurisprudence tells patentees, "If you take less than full monopoly
profits in the short term, you are more likely to have your patent upheld, and
hence be more likely to maintain some monopoly profits for the full patent
term." 47 Measuring commercial success with revenues mitigates the
deadweight loss from granting a full monopoly to the patentee. ,
8
145. LANDES &POSNER, supra note 22, at 11-36.
146. This Figure assumes no price discrimination.
147. Consider the following simple model for a product covered by a single patent with one
hundred percent probability of validity, produced by the patentee, with p for price and q for
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Figure i.
PROFIT-MAXIMIZING PATENTEE ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CERTAIN OF VALIDITY
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quantity. Consider a demand curve described by p = 1oo - q, and marginal cost of
production described by p = 25 + 1 q. Differentiating and solving, we see that the patentee
will maximize profits by producing only thirty units at seventy dollars per unit, whereas the
socially optimal production occurs at fifty units at fifty dollars per unit. This leads to a
deadweight loss of two hundred dollars, with the patentee reaping profits of $1125 before
paying fixed costs.
Now alter the model to allow for the patent to be invalidated, with increased
probability of validity with increased revenues, as might happen with current commercial
success doctrine. Specifically, the probability of enforcement equals ln(p q e / $2500). A
risk-neutral patentee will maximize profits by choosing the production quantity that
maximizes the product of this probability function with the actual profits reaped at that
quantity. The patentee will maximize expected profitability by producing thirty-six units at
sixty-four dollars per unit. The deadweight loss has gone down to ninety-eight dollars (a
fifty-one percent decline), while the patentee reaps pre-fixed-cost profits of $756 (a thirty-
three percent decline). Of course, whether this completely wipes out innovation incentives
depends entirely on the fixed costs of the patentee, including R&D costs. If those costs were
more than $756, then this shift will leave the previously profitable patentee with a loss.
148. Cf Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MiCH. L. REv. 985 (1999) (arguing that uncertainty and delay in the patent system may
have net social benefits by preventing patentees from extracting full monopoly profits).
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B. Counterargument: Unclear Tradeoffs
Using revenues to measure commercial success reduces the ex post
deadweight costs of granting a patent monopoly. This does not say anything,
however, about the wisdom of this policy. These ex post costs are simply part
of the patent tradeoff: in return for their monopoly profits, society creates
incentives for the technological advances that drive long-term economic
growth. In the extreme, society could reduce these ex post costs to zero by
simply making all patents unenforceable. 149 However, that would also take
away many of the financial incentives to produce new technologies.is °
Economists simply do not know and cannot measure the socially optimal
level of patent protection.sl Invention is an extremely unpredictable process,
149. With the inability to exclude others from using the invention, the patentee's profit-
maximizing strategy would be to sell Q,.yiya units at price Ps..ia1yovamW.
15o. There are many other potential incentives to produce new technologies (e.g., being first to
market or using trade secret protection).
151. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENTS SYSTEM 8o (Comm. Print
1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup), available at http://www.mises.org/etexts/patentsystem
.pdf ("If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
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performed by a wildly diverse group of individuals- ranging from scientists in
large laboratories to tinkerers in their garages -who have complex motivations,
part financial, part academic prestige, part sheer curiosity. Complicating
matters further, patentees extract monopoly profits in a variety of manners,
ranging from industrial production to licensing to litigation. Patentees only
remain uniform in keeping their marginal cost structure as private as possible
from competitors - as well as from economists.
Since economics cannot determine whether use of revenues or profits
provides the economically optimal incentives to invent, courts should instead
choose the standard that leads to the most accurate nonobviousness
determination. This Note has aimed to show that measuring commercial
success as profits does just this. Additionally, courts might also aim for
consistency and honoring congressional intent. Congress has clearly indicated
that patentees have the right to extract monopoly profits as an incentive to
invent, ' 2 and case law has consistently honored that determination. '
C. Counterargument: Inapplicable to Newer Industries, yet Still Inaccurate
This Note assumed in Section IV.A that marginal cost was consistently
greater than zero. This assumption makes sense for many industries, such as
heavy manufacturing, oil refining, or aerospace. In these industries, the
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since
we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it."); George L. Priest, What Economists Can
Tell Lauyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW &
ECONOMICS 19, 24 (1986) ("I believe there is little hope that economic analysis can resolve
the question of the appropriate scope of the protection of intellectual property.").
Despite his uncertainty about the patent system as a whole, Machlup did state that
marginal changes to the system might benefit society: "[A]lthough 'it may be impossible to
estimate the total benefits and costs of the patent system, one may attempt to analyze the
marginal benefits and costs of particular moderate changes in the duration, scope, or
strength of patent protection.'" 3 FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND
HUMAN CAPITAL 16S (1984). This Note proposes just such a moderate change. See also
Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 587 (2006).
152. For example, consider the provisions in Title 3S that allow patentees to engage in behavior
that would otherwise run afoul of antitrust law. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (divvying up
sales territory); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000) (tying a patented product to a separate
product).
153. E.g., In re Mahurkar Double Luman Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354
(N.D. I11. 1993).
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revenue-maximizing incentives provided by revenue-based jurisprudence
would indeed mitigate the ex post costs of the patent monopoly. 4
This assumption, however, does not make sense for many of the industries
that compose an ever-greater proportion of both U.S. economic activity and
patents issued. It costs almost nothing for Oracle to create another copy of its
database software or for Pfizer to create another pill. These industries have
high fixed costs for R&D, but marginal costs near zero. All firms maximize
profits (or at least minimize losses) by producing until marginal costs equal
marginal revenues. So, firms with marginal costs near zero will already
produce until marginal revenues are also near zero. By definition, when
marginal revenues are zero, the firm has maximized its revenues.
In other words, firms with low marginal costs - even those without
patents -already maximize their profits (or minimize losses) by maximizing
revenues.55 Measuring commercial success as revenues provides no incentives
to mitigate the ex post costs of a patent, while providing the fact-finder a less
accurate proxy for nonobviousness than would using profitability." 6 As the
economy and composition of patent cases shifts away from the "old economy"
toward high-R&D industries, using revenues will do less and less to minimize
ex post costs, while remaining inaccurate and prone to abuse.
CONCLUSION
Commercial success has become a crucial factor in determining
nonobviousness. Courts currently accept proof for commercial success that
comports with neither classical theory's inferential basis for it, nor prospect
theory's "valuable contract rights" basis, nor congressional intent. By using
revenues instead of profits, courts incorrectly find no commercial success in
cases where the invention's performance on the market should provide strong
proof of nonobviousness .1 7  Conversely, courts will incorrectly infer
nonobviousness from substantial revenues achieved through an unprofitable
level of production.,
8
154. As mentioned in Section IV.B., these ex post costs are the cost of the invention spurred by
the patent system.
155. Maximizing profits (or minimizing losses) from a patent should not be confused with
actually having profits from a patent, which this Note argues should be the basis for proving
commercial success.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See supra Section II.A.
158. See supra Section II.B.
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Using profits will put little additional burden on courts and may actually
lighten their burden. Profits are simply revenues, which courts already
calculate, minus costs, of which businesses must keep track for tax, financial
reporting, and management purposes. Having calculated profits in
determining commercial success, a fact-finder who has found infringement and
must calculate damages will often find much of the requisite data already
available. Should a court feel it lacks the requisite accounting skill, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide extensive guidance on employing a special
master. Courts could even save substantial resources by requiring the patentee
to make an initial showing of profitability before allowing any discovery,
motions, or arguments on commercial success.
Commercial success has existed in patent law for over a centuryl"9 and has a
strong basis in both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. 6o Although
Congress is contemplating a number of reforms to the patent system, it will
likely leave commercial success as is.' 6' Since commercial success will continue
to play a pivotal role in patent litigation, courts should move from revenues to
profits as the primary method of proof.
159. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495 (1876). See generally Kitch, supra
note 16 (reviewing the history of commercial success jurisprudence).
16o. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
161. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.P. 2795, 1o9th Cong. (2005) (not mentioning
commercial success). But see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 19 (2003), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo3/lo/innovationrpt.pdf (recommending shifting the burden of
proof of nexus to the patentee and a case-by-case determination of relevance).
